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Models based on signal detection theory (SDT) have occupied a prominent role in domains
such as perception, categorization, and memory. Recent work by Dube et al. (2010)
suggests that the framework may also offer important insights in the domain of deductive
reasoning. Belief bias in reasoning has traditionally been examined using indices based
on raw endorsement rates—indices that critics have claimed are highly problematic. We
discuss a new set of SDT indices fit for the investigation belief bias and apply them to
new data examining the effect of perceptual disfluency on belief bias in syllogisms. In
contrast to the traditional approach, the SDT indices do not violate important statistical
assumptions, resulting in a decreased Type 1 error rate. Based on analyses using these
novel indices we demonstrate that perceptual disfluency leads to decreased reasoning
accuracy, contrary to predictions. Disfluency also appears to eliminate the typical link
found between cognitive ability and the effect of beliefs on accuracy. Finally, replicating
previous work, we demonstrate that cognitive ability leads to an increase in reasoning
accuracy and a decrease in the response bias component of belief bias.
Keywords: reasoning, belief bias, signal detection theory, memory, individual differences
INTRODUCTION
Signal detection theory (SDT) has occupied a prominent role
in the study of perception (Green and Swets, 1966), categoriza-
tion (Ashby and Gott, 1988), memory (Pazzaglia et al., 2013,
for a review), and more recently, reasoning (e.g., Rotello and
Heit, 2009; Heit and Rotello, 2010). A key feature of SDT is
that it provides tools to disentangle response strategies from
other cognitive processes by formally specifying the underlying
assumptions. SDT assumes that evidence is normally distributed
on a strength dimension (e.g., brightness, line length, familiarity,
or argument strength), and that the overlap between target and
nontarget distributions determines judgment sensitivity. As the
distance between the means of the distributions increases (i.e.,
as the distributional overlap gets smaller), sensitivity increases.
It is also assumed that a participant will only respond “yes” if
the strength of the item under consideration exceeds an internal
criterion. This criterion can be shifted independently from sen-
sitivity as a function of task demands or individual preferences.
The placement of the criterion determines response bias. Certain
conditions cause people to adopt a more conservative criterion,
meaning that a larger strength value is required to respond “yes,”
resulting in a decrease in overall positive responses. Other con-
ditions cause people to adopt a more liberal criterion leading to
more “yes” responses overall. The distinction between sensitiv-
ity and response bias is a critical one that has not always been
adequately addressed by theories of reasoning.
In deductive reasoning, participants are asked to evalu-
ate the logical validity of arguments. A standard belief bias
experiment has logic and belief crossed to yield four types
of arguments: valid-believable (VB), valid-unbelievable (VU),
invalid-believable (IB), and invalid-unbelievable (IU). The
dependent measure is how often each item type is endorsed as
valid. Traditionally, three indexes are derived from the data:
logic index = VB + VU − IB − IU
belief index = VB + IB − VU − IU
interaction index = VU + IB − VB − IU
The logic index is interpreted as a measure of reasoning sensitiv-
ity. The belief index is typically thought to indicate belief-based
response bias. The interaction index is used as a measure of the
effect of beliefs on accuracy, that is, enhanced reasoning in the
face of unbelievable conclusions.
These interpretations of the effects of logic, belief, and the
logic × belief interaction have been called into question by crit-
ics who note that the analysis of raw validity judgments relies
on unstated assumptions about the nature of evidence that may
not be valid (Klauer et al., 2000; Dube et al., 2010). Klauer et al.
(2000) pointed out that the interaction index is difficult to inter-
pret for psychometric reasons: changes in proportions starting
out from different initial values, as is the case for valid and invalid
arguments, cannot readily be compared across conditions. Klauer
and colleagues addressed this issue by assuming that argument
strength was uniformly distributed, specifying a threshold model
as the underlying decision mechanism. Using the multinomial
processing tree (MPT) modeling framework, they conducted an
impressive series of experiments which culminated in the specifi-
cation of the selective processing theory of belief bias, according
to which beliefs affect both the response stage (response bias)
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and the reasoning stage (sensitivity, i.e., accuracy). Following up
on this work, Dube et al. (2010) pointed out that MPT models
and ANOVA of the traditional reasoning indices both predict a
linear relationship between the hit rate (responding “valid” to
valid problems) and the false alarm rate (responding “valid” to
invalid problems). Empirical tests of this assumption, however,
demonstrated that it did not hold for reasoning (Dube et al.,
2010; see also Trippas et al., 2013, 2014; Heit and Rotello, 2014).
Dube et al. put forward SDT as a theoretical framework capa-
ble of dealing with this nonlinear relationship for examining how
conclusion believability affects reasoning sensitivity and response
bias. In applying various SDT models to their own data from syl-
logistic reasoning tasks, they observed that beliefs did not affect
reasoning sensitivity. Instead, the traditional logic × belief inter-
action was interpreted as originating from a belief driven response
bias. This finding was surprising given that most extant theories
predict changes in the quality of reasoning (we focus on these
theories in more detail in the general discussion). Klauer and
Kellen (2011) replied to Dube et al. arguing that MPT thresh-
old models do not necessarily predict linear ROCs. This led them
to propose an alternative MPT model capable of fitting curvi-
linear ROCs (Bröder and Schütz, 2009). Crucially, according to
this updated MPT model, there was an effect of believability on
both reasoning sensitivity and response bias. Furthermore, the
superior fit of this alternative MPT model suggested that con-
clusions drawn from it were preferable to the SDT model. In
turn, Dube et al. (2011) responded to Klauer and Kellen using
model recovery simulations to demonstrate that the updated
MPT model only fit the data better because it was more flexible
than the SDT model, concluding that the SDT model was prefer-
able. In other words, beliefs were thought to affect response bias
only.
Following up on this discussion, Trippas et al. (2013) demon-
strated that the picture may be more complex. Taking an SDT
approach, they observed that while beliefs seemed to only influ-
ence response bias under some conditions, changes in sensitivity
were evident in other conditions. They pointed to individual dif-
ferences as an important mediating factor: reasoners with higher
levels of cognitive ability weremore likely to be influenced by their
prior beliefs in the reasoning stage, in contrast to those with lower
levels of cognitive ability, who mainly exhibited a belief-based
response bias. Although individual differences are also studied
in perception (Klein, 1951), categorization (Whitfield, 1984), and
memory (e.g., Aminoff et al., 2012; Kantner and Lindsay, 2012),
they have played a particularly important role in the development
of reasoning theories (see Stanovich and West, 2000, 2008, for
reviews), suggesting that it is perhaps unsurprising that ignoring
them has led to conflicting findings.
The fine-grained conclusions drawn by Trippas et al. (2013)
could not have been confidently reached without the use of a
formal modeling procedure such as SDT. In fact, recent work
by Heit and Rotello (2014) combined statistical simulations with
an experimental approach to underscore that the issue extends
even beyond the interaction index. According to their data, all
traditional belief bias indices are problematic, with simulations
showing that they lead to an (unacceptably) inflated Type 1 error
rate—and thus unreliable conclusions. In this paper, we follow
up on Heit and Rotello’s work by describing three SDT indices
which are designed to disentangle sensitivity and response bias, by
explicitly estimating the various parameters of the underlying dis-
tributions of argument strength for each participant. In the final
part of this paper, we then apply these indices to a case study in
which the examination of individual differences (cognitive abil-
ity) is illuminating: the role of perceptual fluency on belief bias in
syllogistic reasoning.
SDT INDICES
SDT indices for data resulting from binary decisions (e.g.,
valid/invalid) are d′ and c. d′ is a measure of sensitivity, represent-
ing the distance between the nontarget (i.e., invalid) and target
(i.e., valid) distributions in units of standard deviations. c is a
measure of criterion placement, with lower values indicating a
more liberal response bias (i.e., more yes responses).
d′ = z (H) − z (F)
c = − z (H) + z (F)
2
With H = p(“valid” | valid) and F =p(“valid” | invalid).
A problem with d′ and c is that they entail the assumption of
equal variance between the target (valid) and nontarget (invalid)
distributions, an assumption that is often violated. Alternative
indices which do not require the equal variance assumption are
da and ca (e.g., Macmillan and Creelman, 2005):
da =
√(
2
1 + s2
)
∗ [z (H) − s ∗ z(F)]
ca = −
√
2 ∗ s√(
1 + s2) ∗ (1 + s) ∗ [z (H) + z(F)]
In order to calculate da and ca, one needs to estimate s, which rep-
resents the ratio of the variance of the noise (nontarget) and signal
(target) distributions (also referred to as the z-ROC slope). s can
be estimated using the receiving operator characteristic (ROC)
procedure. In the ROC procedure, participants may be instructed
to supplement each binary decision with a confidence rating.
Combining the binary decisions and the three-point confidence
scale yields six response classes (Figure 1).
6 = yes + 3 (high confidence valid response)
5 = yes + 2 (moderate confidence valid response)
4 = yes + 1 (low confidence valid response)
3 = no + 1 (low confidence invalid response)
2 = no + 2 (moderate confidence invalid response)
1 = no + 3 (high confidence invalid response)
An ROC curve plots hits against false alarms at each confidence
level. s can be estimated from the slope of the z-transformed
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FIGURE 1 | Argument strength distributions of valid and invalid
problems demonstrating the link between confidence ratings and
response criteria.
ROC1. Using da and ca, one can turn to a set of indices that are
analogous to the traditional indices used to study belief bias but
which are better justified given the empirically observed nature of
evidence distributions (Dube et al., 2010, 2011; Heit and Rotello,
2014; but see also Klauer and Kellen, 2011; Singmann and Kellen,
2014). Note that to use the following formulae, s needs to be
estimate three times: once for the full ROC collapsed across
believability, once for the believable condition, and once for the
unbelievable condition:
SDT logic index = da
SDT belief index = caunbelievable − cabelievable
SDT interaction index = daunbelievable − dabelievable
The SDT-logic index measures overall reasoning sensitivity. The
SDT-belief index is the relative difference in response bias
between the unbelievable and the believable condition. Higher
values indicate a greater tendency to accept believable problems.
Finally, the SDT-interaction index indicates the sensitivity dif-
ference between believable and unbelievable arguments, or the
belief-accuracy effect. Much of the debate on the nature of belief
bias in reasoning has focused on the nature of this logic × belief
interaction. We return to this point in the general discussion.
SUMMARY
An increasing body of evidence (Klauer et al., 2000; Dube et al.,
2010, 2011; Klauer and Kellen, 2011; Trippas et al., 2013, 2014;
Heit and Rotello, 2014) suggests that the use of traditional analysis
1An excel based tutorial containing a fitting algorithm is available online:
http://www.psych.umass.edu/download.php?site=48&file=SDT_Tutorial.zip
&type=application/x-zip-compressed. A second option is to use the
R-package MPTinR, which can also be used to fit SDTmodels (Singmann and
Kellen, 2013). A third option is to use Systat or SPSS to fit the SDT model (see
DeCarlo, 2003, for a tutorial using the latter). Finally, a more straightforward
if less reliable method is to estimate the slope of the z-ROC using linear
regression. First, estimate the cumulative proportions for the valid and the
invalid problems, i.e., p(6 | valid), p(6 + 5 | valid), . . . , p(6 + 5 + . . . + 2 |
valid), and the same for the invalid problems. Next, calculate the z-score of
each observation (that is, a transformation using the quantile function of the
standard normal distribution). Finally, regress the z-transformed hits against
the z-transformed false alarms for an estimate of the z-ROC slope s.
techniques for the study of reasoning should be avoided, as these
techniques are very likely to lead to inappropriate conclusions
about the nature of belief bias. Simulations have shown that using
the traditional indices puts researchers at risk of inflated Type
1 error rates, something which can be avoided by applying for-
mal modeling techniques such as SDT (Heit and Rotello, 2014).
Using formal modeling procedures for the study of belief bias
can be impractical, however, because the use of more advanced
experimental designs may entail the fit and comparison of mod-
els with an untenably large number of parameters. In contrast,
the SDT indices approach described here reconciles the SDT
approach with the more classical approach previously offered by
the traditional belief bias indices.
Using the SDT-indices method is straightforward. First, when
conducting a standard belief bias experiment, ensure to collect
confidence ratings alongside each binary validity judgment. Note
that this does necessitate the use of a three-point scale: estimates
can always be recoded and collapsed afterwards. Second, com-
bine the validity judgments and the confidence ratings into the
required number of bins (six in our case) and calculate con-
ditional frequencies denoting how often each response is made
per condition and participant [i.e., f (6 | valid), f (5 | valid),. . . ,
f (1 | valid), repeat for invalid]. Third, use one of the available
tools1 to fit the unequal variance SDT (UVSDT) model to each
participant’s counts to estimate s total, s believable, and s unbelievable.
Occasionally, for some participants, the model will not produce
a reliable fit. In this case it is advised to simply assume s = 1 in
which case the measures generalize to their equal variance SDT
counterparts d′ and c. Alternatively, an average of s across all other
participants can be used. Using the formulae outlined above, cal-
culate da total, ca total, da believable, ca believable, da unbelievable, and ca
unbelievable for each participant. Finally, using these estimates, the
SDT-logic, SDT-belief, and SDT-interaction indices can be calcu-
lated for analysis using standard procedures such as ANOVA. We
now demonstrate the use of this technique by investigating the
role of perceptual disfluency on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.
FLUENCY AND BELIEF BIAS
Fluency, the ease of processing a stimulus, has been a focus of
interest in a variety of cognitive domains. In memory, fluency has
been shown to influence both response bias and sensitivity. Some
fluency-related memory illusions seem to be pure bias effects
(e.g., Verde et al., 2010). On the other hand, perceptual disfluency
(i.e., visual degradation) at encoding can produce better long-
term recognition (e.g., Mulligan, 1996), a counterintuitive effect
that has been linked to the enhanced effort needed to encode
difficult-to-perceive materials. A similar effect of disfluency has
been reported in reasoning. Alter et al. (2007) found that pre-
senting reasoning problems in difficult to read font led to more
accurate judgments. However, their finding has been difficult to
replicate (Thompson et al., 2013). As Dube et al. (2010) noted
in the study of belief bias, apparent inconsistencies in results can
sometimes be traced to the use of analytic techniques that fail to
appropriately distinguish between response bias and sensitivity.
The studies of Alter et al. and Thompson et al. measured accu-
racy by analyzing proportion correct, equivalent to the use of the
traditional reasoning indices. They also exclusively focused on the
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effect of accuracy, ignoring any potential effects of fluency on
response bias. This motivated our examination of the effect of dis-
fluency on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning using the alternative
SDT indices.
METHODS
Participants
Seventy-six undergraduate psychology students from Plymouth
University (UK) participated in exchange for course credit. The
experiment was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty
of Science and Environment at Plymouth University.
Design
Logic (valid vs. invalid) and conclusion believability (believable
vs. unbelievable) were manipulated within subjects. Perceptual
fluency (fluent: standard, easy to read font, n = 38 vs. disfluent:
difficult to read font, n = 38) was manipulated between subjects.
Materials
Following Trippas et al. (2013), a unique list of problems was cre-
ated for each participant by randomly assigning item contents to
complex logical structures for each participant anew (for a list of
the structures see the appendix of Dube et al., 2010). Each list
contained 64 syllogisms, containing equal numbers of VB, VU,
IB, and IU arguments.
In the fluent condition, arguments were presented on a 1080p
LCD monitor in an easy to read font (Courier New, 18 pt., bold,
black on white background). In the disfluent condition, argu-
ments were presented in a difficult to read font (Brush Script MT,
15 pt., italic, light gray on white background, cf. Thompson et al.,
2013).
We measured cognitive ability using the short form of Raven’s
advanced progressive matrices (APM-SF) which has a maximum
score of 12 (Arthur and Day, 1994). This is a sound instrument
for assessing fluid cognitive ability in a short time frame (Chiesi
et al., 2012).
Procedure
Participants were tested on individual computers in small groups
no larger than five. After signing a consent form they were
presented with standard deductive reasoning instructions stating:
In this experiment, we are interested in people’s reasoning. For each
question, you will be given some information that you should assume
to be true. This will appear ABOVE a line. Then you will be asked
about a conclusion sentence BELOW the line. If you judge that
the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, you should
answer “Valid,” otherwise you should answer “Invalid.” After each
validity judgment, you will be asked how confident you are in this
judgment.
1 = you are not confident at all
2 = you are moderately confident
3 = you are very confident
Please try to make use of all three confidence response categories.
After four practice trials (one of each item type), participants were
presented with the 64 reasoning problems. Upon completion of
the reasoning task, the APM-SF was administered, after which
participants were debriefed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
SDT-indices analysis
To investigate the impact of perceptual disfluency on reason-
ing sensitivity, belief bias, and the effect of beliefs on accuracy,
we calculated the SDT-logic, SDT-belief, and SDT-interaction
indices. For each participant, we fit the UVSDTmodel with seven
parameters (five criteria, one mean, and one standard deviation,
hereafter, s) in three different ways. For the SDT-logic index, the
model was fit to the ROC collapsed across believability to pro-
vide an overall estimate of s total, allowing us to calculate da.
Next, we fit the same model separately for the believable condi-
tion and the unbelievable condition to estimate s believable and s
unbelievable. Based on these fits, ca believable, ca unbelievable, da believable,
and da unbelievable were calculated. In turn, these values were used
to calculate the SDT-belief and SDT-interaction indices using the
formulas outlined above.
Model fit
We inspected absolute model fits in terms ofG2 to ensure that our
analyses are not affected by artifacts produced by ill-fitting mod-
els. Across all 228 (3 models × 76 participants) fits, there were 12
cases in which the model could not be fit because the participant
did not employ a sufficient number of response options. For these
participants we calculated the statistics assuming a z-ROC slope
s of 1 (i.e., d′ and c). There were only 8 cases (<4%) for which
the model did not fit the data well (i.e., p < 0.05). The model
provided a good fit of the data for over 96% of the cases.
Preliminary analysis
We compared the three indices with 0 using a one sample t-test to
investigate whether participants reasoned above chance, whether
they showed the belief bias, and whether beliefs affected accuracy
(see, for instance, Evans and Curtis-Holmes, 2005, for a simi-
lar approach using traditional belief bias indices). All t-tests and
ANOVAs are supplemented with Bayes factors (BF) in terms of
evidence in favor of alternative hypothesis/evidence in favor of
the null hypothesis using the JZS prior method using default scal-
ing (Rouder et al., 2009, 2012; Bayes factors were calculated using
the “BayesFactor” package in R, MCMC resampling was used
for the ANOVAs). Note that BF > 1 indicates evidence in favor
of the alternative hypothesis, with BF > 3 indicating substan-
tial evidence, BF > 10 indicating strong evidence, and BF > 100
indicating conclusive evidence. BF < 1 indicates evidence in favor
of the null hypothesis, with <0.3, <0.1, and <0.01 indicating
substantial, strong, and conclusive evidence in favor of the null,
respectively.
Participants performed well above chance, t(75) = 8.41, p <
0.001, BF > 1000. They also showed the standard belief bias,
t(75) = 6.72, p < 0.001, BF > 1000. Finally, beliefs affected rea-
soning accuracy, t(75) = 2.81, p = 0.006, BF = 4.78.
Main analysis
To test the main prediction that disfluency affects reasoning accu-
racy, we performed a One-Way ANOVA with the SDT-logic index
as the dependent variable and condition (disfluent vs. fluent) as
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a between subjects factor. Fluency affected accuracy, F(1, 74) =
6.22, p = 0.015,ω2 = 0.078, BF = 3.30. Contrary to predictions,
however, accuracy was lower in the disfluent (da = 0.51, Az =
64%) compared to the fluent condition (da = 0.92, Az = 74%).
To investigate whether fluency affected response bias, we ana-
lyzed the SDT-belief index using a One-Way ANOVA, with condi-
tion (disfluent vs. fluent) as a between subjects factor. Fluency did
not impact on belief-based response bias, F(1, 74) < 1, p = 0.36,
BF = 0.34.
Finally, we investigated whether fluency affected the belief-
accuracy effect by analyzing the SDT-interaction index. It did not,
F(1, 74) < 1, p = 0.69, BF = 0.25. Means and standard errors
can be found in Table 1.
Individual differences analysis
To ensure that our random assignment was successful, we com-
pared cognitive ability between conditions using a two samples
t-test. Both fluency groups were matched on cognitive ability:
t(74) < 1, p = 0.48, BF = 0.29.
To test whether the effect of fluency on accuracy was mod-
erated by cognitive ability, we performed a 2 (condition: fluent
vs. disfluent) × 2 (cognitive ability: higher vs. lower, based
on median splits) between subjects ANOVA on the SDT-logic
index. There was a main effect of cognitive ability, F(1, 72) =
21.01, p < 0.001, ω2 = 0.23, BF > 1000, indicating that rea-
soning accuracy was higher for the higher ability subgroup.
The main effect of fluency remained significant, F(1, 72) =
9.96, p = 0.002, ω2 = 0.12, BF = 15, confirming that fluency
decreased reasoning accuracy, even when variance due to indi-
vidual differences was accounted for. There was no interaction
between cognitive ability and fluency, F(1, 72) = 0.25, p = 0.62,
BF = 0.35.
To investigate the role of cognitive ability and fluency on the
response bias component of belief bias, we conducted a 2 (cog-
nitive ability) × 2 (fluency) between subjects ANOVA on the
SDT-belief index. A main effect of cognitive ability indicated
that higher ability people were less likely to show the standard
belief bias, F(1, 72) = 9.59, p = 0.003, ω2 = 0.12, BF = 13.96.
There was no main effect of fluency, F(1, 72) = 1.48, p = 0.23,
BF = 0.47. The interaction between ability and fluency was also
not significant, F(1, 72) = 1.07, p = 0.31, BF = 0.47.
Finally, we also analyzed the SDT-interaction index using a
2 (cognitive ability) × 2 (fluency) between subjects ANOVA.
There was no main effect of cognitive ability, F(1, 72) < 1,
p = 0.63, BF = 0.26, or fluency, F(1, 72) < 1, p = 0.65, BF =
0.29. The analysis did reveal that there was a significant abil-
ity × fluency interaction, F(1, 72) = 7.03, p = 0.01, ω2 = 0.09,
BF = 5.04, suggesting that the effect of cognitive ability on the
belief-accuracy effect was mediated by fluency. Follow up tests
comparing the higher and lower ability groups revealed the fol-
lowing pattern. For the lower cognitive ability participants, there
was no effect of fluency, t(39) = −1.44, p = 0.15, BF = 0.70. For
the higher ability group, the SDT-interaction index was higher
for the fluent compared to the disfluent condition, t(33) = 2.28,
p = 0.028, BF = 2.29. Follow-up tests produced strong evidence
for an effect of beliefs on accuracy for the higher ability subgroup
in the fluent condition, t(15) = 3.37, p = 0.004, BF = 11.34. For
the lower ability subgroup in the fluent condition, beliefs did not
affect reasoning accuracy, t(21) = 0.28, p = 0.78, BF = 0.23.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although SDT has taken a prominent role in the development of
theoretical accounts in domains such as perception, categoriza-
tion, and memory, its application to reasoning has been a fairly
recent development (e.g., Heit and Rotello, 2005). As has been
previously argued in the context of belief bias, failure to specify
assumptions about the nature of evidence can lead to interpreta-
tions of data that are misleading or incorrect (Klauer et al., 2000;
Dube et al., 2010). The benefit of a formal model like SDT is in
its specification of assumptions. The provision of analytic tools
that allow the separation of sensitivity and response bias is an
added advantage when it comes to the study of phenomena like
fluency effects, which are known (in the domain of memory) to
potentially impact both. Our findings from the manipulation of
fluency in a reasoning task differed from those of two previous
studies: we found that disfluency led to a reduction in reasoning
sensitivity, in contrast to the improvement reported by Alter et al.
(2007) and the null effect reported by Thompson et al. (2013).
Table 1 | Reasoning accuracy and criterion placement per condition.
Ability Condition da ca bel ca unbel da bel da unbel
Total Collapsed 0.71 (0.08) −0.62 (0.07) 0.14 (0.08) 0.57 (0.07) 0.76 (0.10)
Fluent 0.92 (0.11) −0.55 (0.08) 0.11 (0.11) 0.75 (0.09) 0.97 (0.14)
Disfluent 0.51 (0.12) −0.70 (0.11) 0.17 (0.11) 0.39 (0.11) 0.56 (0.13)
Higher Collapsed 1.06 (0.14) −0.41 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.86 (0.10) 1.09 (0.16)
Fluent 1.35 (0.17) −0.21 (0.09) −0.07 (0.13) 1.00 (0.14) 1.48 (0.19)
Disfluent 0.81 (0.19) −0.57 (0.17) 0.07 (0.17) 0.74 (0.14) 0.76 (0.22)
Lower Collapsed 0.42 (0.08) −0.80 (0.08) 0.26 (0.11) 0.32 (0.09) 0.49 (0.11)
Fluent 0.60 (0.11) −0.79 (0.10) 0.24 (0.15) 0.56 (0.11) 0.60 (0.17)
Disfluent 0.21 (0.11) −0.82 (0.15) 0.27 (0.15) 0.04 (0.13) 0.35 (0.13)
Means (standard errors). Bel = believable; unbel = unbelievable. Descriptive statistics are shown for all participants (total) as well as subgroups of higher and lower
cognitive ability separately.
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While we can only speculate about the extent to which differences
in measurement tools may have contributed to inconsistent find-
ings, it is important that the SDT indices used here do not suffer
from the theoretical shortcomings noted with traditional indices.
For the current study, the main advantage of the SDT-indices was
a decreased probability of Type 1 errors, leading to increased con-
fidence in our findings compared to previous research where the
conclusions are drawn on the basis of more traditional analysis
techniques.
Perceptual fluency mediated the link between cognitive ability
and the belief-accuracy effect. When arguments were presented in
a perceptually disfluent fashion, the link between cognitive abil-
ity and motivated reasoning disappeared. It may be that increased
difficulty discourages or distracts from the use of what is essen-
tially a higher-level strategy. On a similar note, Trippas et al.
(2013) found that time pressure reduced both overall reason-
ing sensitivity and the belief-accuracy effect among higher ability
participants. Drawing this comparison, it may be that a more par-
simonious interpretation of the role of disfluency in reasoning is
simply the following: making a task more difficult hogs the nec-
essary resources typically used to afford an accuracy advantage in
the face of unbelievable arguments.
While we failed to replicate the disfluency advantage, we did
replicate other findings with respect to belief bias. Trippas et al.
(2013) observed a logic × belief interaction effect, mediated by
cognitive ability, that is usually interpreted as a belief-accuracy
effect. Certain theories of belief bias (e.g., mental models theory:
Oakhill et al., 1989; selective processing theory: Klauer et al., 2000;
Evans et al., 2001; modified selective processing theory: Stupple
et al., 2011; dual process theory (DPT): Evans, 2007) predict
that the accuracy effect stems from a type of “motivated reason-
ing,” whereby the unbelievable nature of a conclusion triggers
more effortful reasoning, leading to increased normative per-
formance. Other theories (e.g., misinterpreted necessity: Evans
et al., 1983; metacognitive uncertainty: Quayle and Ball, 2000;
verbal reasoning theory: Polk and Newell, 1995; modified verbal
reasoning theory: Thompson et al., 2003) predict that the inter-
action stems from an asymmetrical belief-based response bias
for valid and invalid arguments, driven by various metacogni-
tive backup strategies. These strategies are thought to be engaged
when reasoning becomes too complicated. Finally, some theories
(the response bias-only account: Dube et al., 2010; the probabil-
ity heuristics model: Chater and Oaksford, 1999) do not predict a
logic × belief interaction, although there may be ways to recon-
cile our findings with these theories. Pure response bias may hold
under some conditions but not others (Heit and Rotello, 2014).
The probability heuristics model might be extended to allow for
a reasoning advantage in the face of unbelievable problems by
assuming that believability influences the probability of using
the p-entailment heuristic. Of the various theories just described,
only three make explicit predictions about the role of individual
differences in belief bias.
According to DPT, motivated reasoning requires working
memory capacity (WMC), in contrast to response bias, which is
a by-product of effortless heuristic processing (Evans, 2007). The
finding that higher cognitive ability (a correlate of WMC) leads
to increased motivated reasoning and decreased response bias is
consistent with this theory. Modified selective processing theory,
an algorithmic level reasoning theory part of the DPT framework
similarly predicts that reasoning ability is linked to an increase
in motivated reasoning and a decrease in response bias. One
notable addition is the prediction of a curvilinear relationship
between motivated reasoning and cognitive capacity: excellent
reasoners who are near ceiling necessarily resist the influence of
their prior beliefs, leading to perfect normative performance, thus
showing no difference in accuracy as a function of believabil-
ity. Metacognitive uncertainty, finally, predicts that those of lower
WMC are more inclined to show the logic × belief interaction.
The current findings run counter to this prediction.
How can future research further distinguish between these rea-
soning theories? Many critics would argue that the study of belief
bias has focused on traditional or classical syllogisms for too long,
ignoring other forms of reasoning more prevalent in daily life.
The study of belief bias in statistical syllogisms, reasoning prob-
lems which include the quantifiers “Most” and “Few” alongside
the traditional ones, will provide a fruitful direction. All of the
belief bias theories discussed here evaluate reasoning competence
with relation to the norm of classical logic. However, accord-
ing to this framework, statistical syllogisms are invalid. If future
experiments were to demonstrate accuracy changes as a function
of beliefs and/or fluency for traditional and statistical syllogisms
in equal measures, then this would suggest that traditional belief
bias theories only capable of dealing with classical logic must be
incorrect in their current form.
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